Machine learning as a service (MLaaS), and algorithm marketplaces are on a rise. Data holders can easily train complex models on their data using third party provided learning codes. Training accurate ML models requires massive labeled data and advanced learning algorithms. The resulting models are considered as intellectual property of the model owners and their copyright should be protected. Also, MLaaS needs to be trusted not to embed secret information about the training data into the model, such that it could be later retrieved when the model is deployed.
Introduction
A major concern with respect to algorithm marketplaces and machine learning platforms is with respect to protecting the copyright of models (Adi et al. 2018; Chen, Rohani, and Koushanfar 2018; Rouhani, Chen, and Koushanfar 2018; Uchida et al. 2017) . The challenging problem is to embed some watermark into the model which is robust to changes, and is detectable with high confidence if a secret key is known.
Another concern is that machine learning models can leak information about the members of their training data (Shokri et al. 2017 ). The threat is, however, beyond passive inference attacks. A malicious training code can enable an attacker to turn the trained model into a covert channel (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017) . A model which is trained using a malicious code could lead to the leakage of sensitive information about its training data, when deployed.
In both cases, the objective is to stealthily embed information in the model that can be recovered only if an entity knows the decoding secret. The underlying techniques and objectives of encoding attacks are very similar, but the trust models are different. Existing embedding algorithms, exploit the unused capacity of deep neural networks (Arpit et al. 2017) , and embed secret information by overfitting the models on encoded secrets, or writing them on the model parameters. To this end, a large number of poisoned training data (approximately 4, 000 data records (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017)) needs to be embedded into such models, and a large number of parameters are modified by the algorithm. These limit the scalability of the embedding algorithms, as they quickly run into a conflict with the accuracy of the model. They also become very fragile with respect to changes in the model (as particular parameters in the model are responsible for an embedding, and removing them would remove the embedded information).
Our contributions. In this paper, we introduce membership encoding for deep learning, which could be either used for watermarking a model to test its ownership, or for privacy attacks when training code is supplied by the adversary. For the latter case, it could also be used to analyze the susceptibility of a model to covert channel attacks. In our algorithm, during the training, a subset of the training data is selected to be encoded. The selection can be based on a sensitive criteria (e.g., cancer patient records) in the scenario of privacy attacks. Then, we develop an algorithm which encodes (1 bit) membership information of the selected data records into the model based on a secret key. After the model is trained, one can decode the encoded membership information from the model, only if he has the secret key.
To perform encoding, we design a membership encoding network, where a membership discriminator model is trained along with the target model. We optimize the model's main objective function, and the discriminator's objective simultaneously. This leads to finding a membership discriminator and a classification model that jointly maximize the accuracy of membership inference, and yet preserves the prediction accuracy of the model. The discriminator, which simulates the membership inference, plays a very important role. It forces the model to learn distinguishable representations (in the model's hidden layers or output) for the targeted subset of the training data, compare to other data.
We evaluate membership encoding on several deep learning benchmark datasets and models: MNIST, CIFAR10, Purchase and Texas Hospital datasets, with MLP, CNN, and ResNet models. Our results show that our encoding al-gorithm can successfully train a model with high test accuracy and yet infer membership information accurately for a substantial subset of the training data. We test our membership encoding algorithm in scenarios where the trained model is released (white-box access) as well as when it is accessible via prediction API (black-box access). For example, in the white-box case, membership encoding can achieve 0.97 precision on the Texas Hospital dataset with 20% (10, 000 records) of the training data being encoded. The model's test accuracy remains as high as 97.82%, which is the same as model trained without membership encoding. On CIFAR10 ResNet model, the encoding accuracy is 0.96, while test accuracy is 91.85% (with 0.25% accuracy drop compared to the baseline). In the black-box case, membership encoding can achieve 0.85 precision (compared to 0.87 in the white-box setting) on 20% of MNIST images with model's test accuracy drop 1.1% (compared to 0% drop in the white-box setting). To put this in perspective, note that the encoding membership for MNIST is extremely hard as the digits images in one class are visually very similar, and membership inference attacks perform poorly on MNIST (Shokri et al. 2017) .
We also show that our encoding algorithm is robust to input and model modifications, such as input redaction, parameter pruning, and model fine-tuning. We examine encoding performance on CIFAR10 when part of the input image is masked with 0. Our white-box attack can achieve 0.88 precision even when the center 8 × 8 part (which is the most important part) of a 32 × 32 image is removed. We also evaluate the cases where the trained model is transformed using pruning or fine-tuning techniques, which are common practice in ML to reduce the model size and for transfer learning. Our results show that the membership inference is accurate as long as the model is not transformed too much to the extent of damaging its own test accuracy. We further develop an adversarial pruning algorithm that significantly preserves the membership information in the trained model even when 70% of the model parameters are removed.
Background and Notations
We denote machine learning model as a function f θ : X → Y, where X is the input (feature) space, Y is the output space, and θ are its parameters. We focus on classification models, where X is a q-dimensional vector space and Y is a discrete set of classes. The model outputs argmaxf θ (x) as the predicted class label. The training data is denoted as
with features x i and class label y i . We denote deep learning model f as layers of non-linear transformations [h θ1 , . . . , h θ l ]. The activations at layer j is computed as a j = h θj • h θj−1 • · · · • h 1 (x). The parameters θ = {θ 1 . . . θ l } describe the weights used for all l layers of transformation.
Membership inference attacks
Membership inference attacks (MIA) aim to determine whether a target data record is in dataset D, when the adversary can observe some computation (e.g., aggregate statistics, machine learning model) over D. Prior work performed membership inference on aggregate statistics, e.g., in the context of genomic studies (Homer et al. 2008; Backes et al. 2016) , location time-series (Pyrgelis, Troncoso, and De Cristofaro 2018), or noisy statistics in general (Dwork et al. 2015) . Previous MIA against machine learning model focuses on black-box setting, where the adversary can query the model and observe the output prediction probability for a target record (x, y) and then decide whether (x, y) ∈ D (Shokri et al. 2017 ). Shokri et al proposed a method to learn the statistical difference between outputs of members and nonmembers by training a membership discriminator using the model output probability vector as the attack feature vector.
Membership Encoding
The goal of membership encoding is to encode a one-bit membership information for a substantial selected subset of training data into a ML model during training. After the model is trained, the encoded membership information for the selected set can be extracted by querying the model. The quality of the membership encoding is measured as how accurately can one extract the membership information for encoded records. Membership encoding has several applications including copyright protection watermarking of the ML model and training data privacy attacks.
Membership encoding for watermarking
We assume model owner trains a watermarked model locally and deploy the model in a trusted third-party ML service provider. The ML service provider uses a secret key s provided by the model owner for verification of model ownership. Model owner encodes the membership information for a selected set of data records using membership encoding during training using secret key s. The membership information of this particular set is the watermark. When a user demands to claim the model ownership, he passes a secret key to the ML service provider, who then uses this key to perform membership inference on user provided records. Only when there are enough encoded data records being correctly decoded as member can one claim ownership.
Adversary in this case aims to pass the verification and steal the model. Passing the verification requires the adversary to know: (1) the exact encoded training records and (2) the secrets s to extract the membership information on encoded records . Thus, even for adversary who has knowledge about the selected training records, faking a watermark is highly unlikely as adversary has no information about the secret s.
Membership encoding for privacy attacks
On a machine learning platform, the client provides the data, and we assume a third-party as the adversary provides the program to train a machine learning model, following the setting in (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017) . The machine learning program has full access to the client's data during the training, while the adversary cannot exfiltrate the data during training as the platform is secure and isolated. The only outcome of the process is the model, which is owned by the client. After training, the client might allow Symbol Meaning D C Client's training records D C-m A subset of D C to be encoded as member D C-nm D C /D C-m , encoded as nonmember D A Auxiliary random inputs D A-m A subset of D A to be encoded as member
Hold-out test dataset Table 1 : List of notations on dataset public access to it via an application or a machine-learningas-a-service platform (black-box release). Client might also share or sell the whole model (white-box release). We assume the adversary can get access to the model at this stage.
In the white-box case, adversary has access to the model parameters, and in the black-box case, adversary can only send inputs and obtain the model predictions on them.
A direct privacy attack of membership encoding is membership inference attacks. Adversary uses the model as a covert channel to encode membership of training data during training and decode it when the model becomes publicly available. Adversary might be interested in encoding training data that have a particular sensitive value, e.g., patients with HIV+. In the inference phase, adversary tries to determine the membership of some target data records, that are (partially) available, thus inferring the missing sensitive attributes.
Overview of membership encoding algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents membership encoding. The goal is to create a distinguishable representation of the client's training data in the model during the training, such that the attacker can infer their membership when the model is released. Membership encoding algorithm optimizes classifier f for encoding the membership of a subset D C-m of its training set, while also minimizing the classification loss (min θ L ce over D C ). A discriminator d is trained, along side the model, to encode membership information into the model predictions or its activation functions. The joint optimization for membership encoding is min θ,φ L enc , where the objective is to separate the representations of D C-m ∪ D A-m from that of D C-nm ∪ D A-nm . The generated synthetic datasets D A-m and D A-nm have different distributions and help separating D C-m from D C-nm , thus encoding the membership of D C-m . We use gradient descent to solve the optimization problems and update the parameters.
In detail, membership encoding has two phases: encoding phase, and inference phase.
Encoding phase
Selecting encoded data. For membership encoding to be used as privacy attack, we assume adversary provides the malicious algorithm which has access to the training data. The adversary targets a subset of the training data, that might have common sensitive attributes, to secretly embed into the model. Adversary selects a subset D C-m from the client dataset D C to be the data we want to encode as member. Let D C-nm be the remaining subset of the training set, D C-nm = D C \ D C-m . After the malicious training is over, and the client publishes the model, the attacker runs a membership (decoding) inference attack to confidently decide whether a record is in D C-m or not. For watermarking, model owner can randomly sample a subset of training data as D C-m . At verification time, only this subset will be useful for claiming model's ownership.
Generating synthetic data. Membership encoding uses synthetic data points to guide training the discriminator during the membership encoding phase. The exact same data is re-generated during the inference phase to reconstruct the discriminator. The synthetic data is composed of two disjoint sets D A-m , D A-nm that are generated from two different distributions. They are used to force the classification model to learn distinguishable representations for the D C-m and D C-nm , which are similar to the synthetic datasets D A-m and D A-nm , respectively.
The generation of synthetic data is outlined in function GenSyntheticData in Algorithm 1. The generation process is deterministic based on a secret seed s. The function first generates two mean vectors µ m , µ nm from uniform distribution. Then, two clusters of feature vectors are sampled from two multivariate Gaussian distributions with the two uniform mean vectors and identity covariance matrix. This procedure creates natural separation between D A-m and D A-nm , making the internal features learned by the model easier to distinguish between member and nonmember.
Membership discriminator. To enforce separating the representations of member and nonmember data, a membership discriminator is augmented with the main classification model. The membership discriminator d φ with parameter φ is a binary classifier that takes the internal activations (hidden layer) or the output of the main classification model as input and predicts their membership. We denote h θ (x) as the set of activation units computed on x and the discriminator outputs d φ (h θ (x)) a probability value for membership prediction, i.e.,
Membership encoding loss. The membership discriminator outputs label 1 for data that adversary selected to encode as member and 0 otherwise. To train the membership discriminator, the adversarial training algorithm optimizes the membership encoding loss, which is defined as following:
This loss function is used to find the jointly optimal set of parameters for the classification model and the membership discriminator. We solve the optimization problem using stochastic gradient descent algorithm. For each mini-batch of data sampled from D m ∪ D nm , we compute the gradient of the encoding loss function with respect to θ and φ, and update them accordingly, as shown in Algorithm 1. 
generate 2n synthetic data records of dimension q seed(s) seed with secrete s to ensure the generation process is deterministic µm ∼ U(α, β) q mean vector for member mixture µnm ∼ U (α, β) q mean vector for nonmember mixture
Note that the loss function for the main classification model, which is defined as
, needs to be computed on the training set D C , and optimized simultaneously with the adversary's loss. However, as the membership encoding loss function is computed over a larger dataset which includes D A (which is essentially random data), we cannot define a single loss function to solve both the optimization problems. Instead, since we have two sources of data, we train the model and discriminator alternatively: in each iteration, we first optimize the membership encoding loss L enc and then optimize the main classification loss L ce . This helps finding an encoding for the target training set, without much sacrificing the classification accuracy of the target model.
Encoding membership in the model's output. In the applications of privacy attacks, assume the client does not publish a white-box model after training, but rather makes it available through a black-box prediction API service. In this scenario, adversary can no longer observe the intermediate representation but only the output probability distribution for each input.
A naive way to perform membership encoding is to use the output probability vector directly as the feature to distinguish membership, and pass it to the discriminator. However, such encoding could significantly affect the accuracy of the main task. This is because the output signals are limited in a small range [0, 1], and also they are directly used for the main classification task. To solve this problem, we propose encoding the membership in the logarithmic transformation of the output probabilities, and use h θ = log(f θ ).
The log of the probabilities is the logit values before the softmax layer, up to a constant factor. The log values are not constrained and thus provide more flexibility in encoding the membership.
Inference phase
After the model is trained and the client publishes the model (as white-box or black-box), membership discriminator if recreated for inference the membership information.
Inference is proceed by first regenerating the synthetic dataset that is used during training, and then querying the target model with the synthetic data, and computing the activations (in white-box case) or output (in black-box case) using h θ . After obtaining the activations for records in D A , the function trains a membership discriminator d φ using these activations and their membership labels (1 for data points in D A-m , and 0 for data points in D A-nm ).
For any target data record x, its membership probability is computed as d φ (h θ (x)). This information is then used for privacy attacks or verifying model's watermark.
Experiments Datasets and ML models
We evaluate membership encoding on benchmark datasets, including Purchase 1 , Texas hospital records (Shokri et al. 2017 ), MNIST and CIFAR10. We also evaluate on a variety of deep learning models. For Purchase and Texas hospital For all models described above, we augment with a linear classifier as the membership discriminator. During encoding, we apply hyperbolic tangent function on the selected activation units as in white-box case and logarithmic transformation on the model output as in the black-box case before feeding to the membership discriminator. In decoding phase, we use a one-layer MLP with 128 hidden units as the membership discriminator in inference phase. The model is trained with the activations units or outputs from auxiliary synthetic data queried from the target ML model.
Evaluation metrics
For all experiments, we report the test accuracy (percent of correctly classified test records) of the main classification task to evaluate effects of membership encoding on the main model performance. As for evaluating membership encoding, we use precision (what fraction of records inferred as members are indeed members of the training dataset), recall (what fraction of the training dataset's members are correctly inferred as members) and AUC evaluated on selected training data and test data.
White-box encoding experiments
Membership encoding performance. Table 2 summarizes the result. The baseline accuracy refer to the test accuracy trained benignly without membership encoding. On all tasks, the models trained with membership encoding can achieve very similar test performance in terms of the main task, meaning these encoded models can generalize as well as the baseline models. In the same time, the encoded models leak 20% percent of training data with high precision, recall and AUC. This shows that deep learning models are capable of performing multiple tasks at the same time even though one of the tasks is to deliberately leak information about training data.
Effects of capacity of the model. We next evaluate the relationship between the capacity of the model and amount 128, 192, 256, 320, 384, 448 and 512 . We fix the amount of data to be encoded as 20% of training data, which is 30,000 records. For MNIST CNN, we change the number of filters in the second convolutional layer to vary the size of the model. We set the number of filters to be 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 112 and 128. We set other hyper-parameters to be the same as baseline white-box experiments.
The results are shown in Figure 1 . For both Purchase and MNIST, the test accuracy is not affected. When increasing the capacity, the encoding performance increased slightly on Purchase dataset while increased more drastically on CI-FAR10 dataset. This shows that as the model capacity increases, there is a point where model can achieve high performance on both main task and membership encoding.
Black-box encoding experiments
We next evaluate the black-box encoding where membership information is encoded in the log space of the probability output. We evaluates on MNIST with MLP and CNN and CIFAR10 with VGG. For both experiments, we use the log-probabilities of all 10-class output to encode the membership for 20% of training records. Other training hyperparameters are the same as in white-box encoding.
The results are in Table 3 . The test accuracy on main classification task drops slightly comparing to white-box encode. The encoding performance remains relatively high for MNIST with CNN and CIFAR10 with VGG.
Visualization of encoded information.
To explain why our encoding mechanism works, Figure 2 visualizes the activation units and model outputs used for encoding the membership with PCA and T-SNE projections on CIFAR10 dataset with VGG.
In both PCA and T-SNE projections, there is a clear separation between member data D A-m , D C-m and nonmember data D A-nm , D C-nm . On the other hand, we can see the client's data D C-m , D C-nm still grouped into 10 clusters (corresponding to 10 class labels) in T-SNE projections. This shows that the hidden activations and output predictions are learned to be separable for training and testing data and to be class-dependent for the main task at the same time.
Robustness Analysis
Redacted input. In reality of privacy attacks, adversary may only observe a redacted data record (e.g. only some public available attributes for a patient's data) for membership inference. We evaluate the encoding performance where the input images are maksed (removed) on CIFAR10 dataset. We first consider two modes of masking : (1) the center of the image is masked (2) the boundary part of the image is masked but center is retained. For both masking mode, we denote the width of masked region as w and evaluate both white-box and black-box encoding performance with w set to 4, 8, 12 and 16. The results are summarized in Table 4 . The white-box encoding performance is very robust against masking when the masking area is small (w = 4 or w = 8). The precision remains high while the recall drops more significantly for black-box encoding.
Model pruning. The deep learning models can have millions of parameters, which makes it hard to deploy in resource-constraint scenario (e.g. portable devices). Clients may want to compress the model before using it. There is a line of research on how to compress a trained large deep learning model into smaller size (Bucilu, Caruana, and Niculescu-Mizil 2006; Han et al. 2015; Han, Mao, and Dally 2015; Howard et al. 2017) . These model compression methods could potentially destroy the information encoded.
We consider a commonly used compression technique called pruning ) which sparsify the model parameters by setting the smaller weight parameters to zero. We evaluate classification performance and encoding performance on pruned model on CIFAR10 with VGG and ResNet. We set percentage of pruned parameters to be 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90%. Plots on the left in Figure 3 summarizes the results. Membership encoding can achieve near 0.70 precision when the pruned percentage is 30%. When the pruned percentage increases, both encoding performance and test classification accuracy drop.
Transfer learning. Another common practice in ML is transfer learning: client trains a model for one task and later on uses the model for a different task. The most popular way to perform transfer learning is to use the trained model as a feature extractor by replacing the output layer for the new task and then fine-tune the spliced model on a new dataset.
We evaluate our encoding performance on models trained on CIFAR10 and then fine-tuned on a different dataset, STL-10 2 . STL-10 is a similar dataset as CIFAR10 but with different objects and class labels (Coates, Ng, and Lee 2011) . Each image is 96 × 96 in size and has three channels and there are in total 5,000 training images and 800 testing images. In order for STL-10 to be used as input for models trained on CIFAR10, we resize each image to 32 × 32 in size. We use the trained VGG and ResNet models as the feature extractors and fine-tune the models for 60 epochs with learning rate being 0.001. We evaluate the test performance on STL-10 and encoding performance on CIFAR10 every 10 epochs. The results are shown in Figure 4 . For both models, the encoding performance remains stable across number of epochs which demonstrates that membership encoding is robust against fine-tuning to a different task.
Related Work
Membership inference. Membership inference against ML models has been studied in (Shokri et al. 2017; Rahman et al. 2018; Long et al. 2018) . The attack in (Shokri et al. 2017) focuses black-box models, exploiting the differences in the models' outputs on training and non-training inputs. Their attack performance is best when the target model f θ is overfitted on the training data. In membership encoding, on the other hand, the trained models can be well-generalized and yet leak membership information.
Followup work extends membership inference attack to differential private ML model and shows that model needs to sacrifice its test performance to achieve membership privacy (Rahman et al. 2018) . Other work showed that wellgeneralized model can leak membership information (Long et al. 2018 ) . However, their attack first needs to identify vulnerable records which consist only handful of records in the training set. Our encoded model leaks the membership for a substantial subset of training data.
Memorization in ML. Zhang et al. showed that deep learning models can achieve perfect performance on training data even the data are randomly generated. Followup work presented malicious training algorithms to force an ML model that encodes the training data, which can be later extracted with either white-box or black-box access to the model, without affecting the accuracy of the model on its main task (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017) . In their whitebox attacks, the information is embedded in the parameter θ directly while our work encodes information in the hidden activations or outputs. Their black-box attack uses synthetic data to encode the training data in the output prediction. However, to encode one lossy version of CIFAR10 image for example, their attack needs 4,096 random data, limiting their attack to encode only a couple of inputs.
Carlini et al. also showed deep learning-based generative sequence models memorizes training text data unintentionally. Adversary can extract some specific inputs with black- In opposition to above attacks, membership encoding aims to encode and infer the exact membership information for a subset of training set rather than some properties of a class or a subgroup in the training data.
Conclusion
We presented membership encoding that forces deep learning model to learn distinguishable representation for a substantial fraction of training data with negligible loss in test accuracy. Our experimental results showed that one can perform accurate membership inference on target data records even if the input data is redacted or the trained model is being modified. Our encoding mechanism can be used for watermarking for copyright protection as well as inferring membership of sensitive training data. found in (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014) .
Residual networks (ResNet) is a recently proposed network architecture and dominates many computer vision task (He et al. 2016) . ResNet solves the gradient vanishing problem happened during optimizing very deep CNNs by adding identity mappings from lower layers to higher layers. We use a 32-layer residual network for CIFAR10.
Hyper-parameter setup. On all dataset, we randomly select 20% of training data for encoding membership. We generate 1,000 synthetic data with 500 being encoded as member and rest 500 encoded as nonmember. We training the discriminator MLP at inference time for 80 epochs with momentum SGD and learning rate 0.001.
For Purchase dataset, we use a two layer MLP with 256 and 128 hidden units for the two layers. For Texas dataset, we use a larger MLP with 1024 and 256 hidden units. For both Purchase and Texas, we train the model with momentum SGD and set learning rate to be 0.02 for the main model and 0.01 for the discriminator. We train the model for 80 epochs and decay the learning by a factor of 10 at epoch 60.
We randomly select 50% of hidden units in the second layer for encoding.
For MNIST dataset, we experiment with both MLP and CNN. We use two-layer MLP with 512 and 128 hidden units. For CNN, we use 64 filters of size 5 × 5 in the first convolution layer and 128 filters of size 5 × 5 in the second and the convolution layers are followed by a fully connected layer with 256 hidden units. For both MLP and CNN, we use momentum SGD with learning being 0.02 for both main model and discriminator. We train the model for 100 epochs and decay the learning by a factor of 10 at epoch 80. We randomly select 50% of hidden units in the last fully connected layer in both MLP and CNN for encoding.
For CIFAR10 dataset, we use VGG and ResNet. For both models, we use momentum SGD with learning being 0.02 for main model and 0.01 for discriminator. We train the model for 80 epochs and decay both learning rates by a factor of 10 at epoch 40 and 60. For encoding, we randomly select 20% of hidden units in the second to last convolutional layer for VGG and second to last residual block for ResNet.
Additional Experiments
Loss trajectory of membership encoding. Figure 5 shows trajectories of the classification loss on member, nonmember and test data as well as discriminator loss. Counterintuitively, the classification task and encoding task converges without conflicting each other during training as both losses L ce , L enc converged simultaneously. The plot also shows that our white-box encoding does not cause overfitting in the membership dataset as the classification loss for both members and nonmembers converged to the same point. the cases in white-box encoding. However, the classification loss on nonmember data is lower then that on member data. This suggests that black-box encoding biased the outputs on members data, and as a result loss convergence is affected subtly.
Effects of number of encoded data. We also study how encoding performance affected by increasing amount of data to be encoded in a fixed size model. We evaluate the performance on Purchase and CIFAR10 with VGG. We start from training model with encoding 20% of the training data and increase the amount of encoded data by 5,000 gradually and evaluate the encoding performance in each of the trained model. Adversarial pruning. Pruning, as described in Robust Analysis section, affects the main tasks classification accuracy, it is common to fine-tune the pruned model on the original dataset. We develop an adversarial pruning algorithm that preserve the membership information encoded in the pruned model. In the scenarios of privacy attacks, client might need the expertise to perform pruning with fine-tuning as in the case for training the model and thus the code for pruning could be supplied by the adversary. The adversarial pruning algorithm is similar to membership encoding: we first select p% smallest parameters in a maliciously trained model and set them to 0. We then augments the pruned model with a freshly initialized membership discriminator. He then fine-tunes the pruned model and the discriminator with client's data and auxiliary synthe-sized data as in Function MembershipEncoding of Algorithm 1. During update the classifier parameters θ, the gradients for the pruned parameters are set to zeros so that the fine-tuned model remains pruned.
We evaluate the adversarial model pruning on CIFAR10 dataset with VGG. We fine-tune the pruned model for 20 epochs and set the learning rate to be 0.001. The results on the fine-tuned models are shown in plots on the right in Figure 6 . There is almost no loss in test accuracy and minor drop in encoding performance even when 70% of the model parameters are set to zero.
Advanced Privacy Attacks with Membership Encoding
In this section, we describe some of the advanced privacy attacks using membership encoding: reconstruction attack, a hybrid attack with prior attacks (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017).
Reconstruction attack. The attacker aims at reconstructing a data record which is partially known to him. The attacker might have some auxiliary information about the data as well. For example, The adversary might know a DNA sequence with missing sub-sequences, and in addition he knows the candidate sub-sequences. Adversary can utilize the membership inference attack to perform this reconstruction. Adversary can query with membership discriminator with all probable combination of the full record. The one which receives highest confidence to be classified as member is the reconstructed record. Given the high accuracy of our attack, even in the case of missing data, it can be used to perform accurate reconstruction attacks.
Hybrid attack. Our membership encoding attack can be composed with previous embedding attack to form a stronger attack. Prior work proposed several ways of encoding the exact bits of data record into a ML model while the number of records that can be embedded is limited to a few hundreds for white-box and a dozen records for black-box setting, due to the limited capacity of the model (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017).
In reality, not all bits for a data record are sensitive. Adversary can utilize our membership encoding attack to scale up the embedding attack. For each record that adversary wishes to embed, he splits the record into sensitive attributes and nonsensitive attributes. Adversary then encodes the membership information for these records of interest, using our algorithm, and embeds their sensitive attributes and a compressed version of the nonsensitive attributes (e.g. a short hash) using large data embedding methods (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017). During the decoding (inference) phase, given a redacted input x with only nonsensitive attributes, adversary first verifies whether x is encoded as member. Our attack is very accurate on partial data. If it has been a member, the adversary proceeds to compute the compressed version of x and finds the corresponding embedded sensitive attributes, using the decoder (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017). The major advantage of the hybrid attack is that adversary can use membership encoding to rule out the possible collisions in matching the compressed nonsen-sitive attribute. In addition, since embedded information for each record is compressed, the model can thus leak information for a large set of records.
